Abstmct-A s the trend of successful network attacks continue to rise, better forms of intrusion detection and prevention are needed. This paper addresses network traffic visualization techniques that aid an administrator in recognizing attacks in real time. Our approach improves upon current techniques that lack effectiveness due to an overemphasis on flow, nodes, or assumed familiarity with the attack tool, causing either late reaction or missed detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
We hear about new network worms regularly in the news niedia and rather than slowing down, the worms are getting smarter and spreading more rapidly. One example is the Witty worm, which spread only the day after the vulnerability was announced [I] . This targeted an intrusion detection systems (IDS) product and deleted data from hard drives. The Sasser worm spread 17 days after the patch was released [2] and was similar to other new worms kiecause it spread quickly and shut down major infrastructure components. There are continually new vulnerabilities available to target and there is no sign that this trend will slow down. There are also ongoing "zero-day" exploits, those without a software patch, that are particularly difficult to stop. Thus more needs to be done than solely relying on signature-based methods or waiting for the next patch.
Compounded by increasing bandwidth due t o higher capacity links, and the general growth of the Internet, especially home users with limited security, attacks are proliferating. IDS have more traffic to filter through limiting the number of signatures that can be checked. The Internet is the fastest growing information medium [3]. Also, processAbdullah, Lee . Here we present a prototype to aid in intrusion detection by visualizing network packet header data over time. We created a tool that is easy to understand, and allows those with minimal knowledge of network security to use it effectively. We have used scaling techniques on the data to reduce occlusion and used stacked histograms to efficiently visualize the data. The background information for our work is explained in section 11, where an explanation of the data and analysis is given along with current related work in security visualization. Section 111 describes the system design, which includes the capture and graph process, how axis parameters are chosen, how the data is scaled and the threat models we use to illustrate the design. Results using forensic captures are given in section IV. Section V presents our future work and section VI discusses our conclusions. First, we will give the background on the data available by packet capture and examine the fieids under consideration. Next, we will explain the motivation for real-time and forensic analysis. Finally, related work in network visualization is given. shown instead of flow information to be able to ploVquantities in real time, as packets are received on the network, and without having to wait €or flows to finish. We give an overview for all IP addresses and traffic in the network, giving the user the choice to filter €or detail after the fact for real-time visualization and detailed analysis.
SYSTEM DESIGN
The system uses tcpdump to capture packets by !istening in promiscuous mode on the network. These packets are then parsed for the needed values in the headers. Calcurations are then made over time and these values are plotted to the graph. Open source Java libraries are used for generating the graphs 1201. 
A . Design Goals
Our goal is to get an overall view of what is happening on the network. In the case of plotting port activity, we want t o separate and arrange it t o see important details without occlusion. More specifically we wish to provide context first, followed by the user specified detail in a drill down fashion. Seeing data over time will help t o highlight any patterns or trends. Our scheme shows aggregate port quantity, instead of the more common flow count per IP.
Some design goals are as follows:
We want this system to be useful for both forensic and real-time analysis. Georgia Tech €or our visualization examples. The Honeynet at G T is directly connected to the Internet and has no production software therefore any incoming traffic is suspicious. The machines have different operating systems hence they can be targeted by a wide variety of attacks.
Histogram Plots
Histograms are easy to interpret and are good for visualizing a large data set because the data fits easily onto the plot due to stacking, the intra-bar, relative sizing is insightful, and comparisons with other bars on the chart are easily made based on their relative height [Zl]. Using multidimensional data to plot a retationship between two parameters over time can be visualized by using either a 3D chart or a 2D histogram. The disadvantage of a 3D view is in comparing patterns, widths and heights that are at various distances from the user, i.e., on the Z-axis, which can distort the perception 1221. Avoiding occlusion issues in 3D is difficult, and often requires user navigation. In a 2D stacked chart, it could be more difficult to focus on activity for a single port. To test the effectiveness of these techniques, we employed 2D visualizations against captures of real attacks.
A.2 Axis Parameters
The packet header fields can be categorized as ordinal (source and destination ports and IP addresses) and interval (packet count and total bytes). The horizontal axis i s time and the vertical axis is used to display interval quantities. We chose to create stacked histograms mapping the horizontal axis t o time and the vertical axis to interval values of packet count and total bytes. See figure 2 for an example.
A.3 Scaling and Occlusion Issues
A.3.a Overall Graph Occlusion . Ideally we want to fit all the information needed on the graph without overlap ahd disorder. High value quantities would either block or skew the relative scale, making it difficult t o interpret results. TO counter this, traditional methods from information visualization suggest rearranging the data, allowing the user to tilt, zoom, scale, and pan. Logarithms are one method of scaling data quantities but the cube root function was chosen as a substitute because it scales better with the range of values including zero with the additional benefit that values less than one, but greater than zero, are still mapped to positive values. (See figure 8 and We divided the rest of the ports into ranges to provide less occlusion. A user can see detail for a port range by selecting that on the graph. In our examples, using the Honeynet capture, we will use the "Top Ten" 1231 most probed ports as the known common ports. For both Windows and Unix systems, the well-known and commonly assigned port range is 0-1023 [24] . We want to focus more on these ports because we believe that a majority of vulnerabilities and services occur in this range and most attacks start with this range to gain access. After separating the common ports, the remaining "well-known" ports are placed into bins of 100 (see figure 2) so that they do not cause an over abundance of port segments that are then difficult to read on the graph. We chose 100 because it is small enough to see the relatively high activity in this range. In real-time traffic analysis, the time window should be long enough to capture a representative sample of packets, but not so long that fluctuations in port activity are hard to recognize. Honeynet traffic generates good illustrations for our visualization since all of the traffic is "abnormal" and because a specific attack has been collected in the captures we have used. Of the techniques mentioned, time scaling needs more experimentation than the others to effectively be used with regular network traffic. We want just the right granularity; if it is too small, we can mistake variances in normal traffic t o be anomalous, and if it is t.oo large, again we will not see the variances that are anomalous. The other scaling techniques are applicable to both situations. For example, the Sasset capture did have other traffic in the background (representative of "normal" background traffic), and through IP, port and quantity scaling, we are able to see both that background traffic and the penetration and subsequent activity of the Sasser worm. With mote development and testing, we would like to experiment with regular network traffic.
B. Threat Models
The following classes of attacks are the most common types that occur. To help demonstrate the effectiveness of the tool, packet captures of these attacks are visualized.
B.1 Network Scanning and Mapping
Scanning a network is commonly a precursor to an attack. A blueprint of the network can be made, finding active ports and IP addresses on the victim host. This is performed by sending probe packets to groups of desired IP addresses. If a response is received, then we know the respective ports and hosts are active. While less aggressive (or more subtle) naive scans are relatively easy to detect, scans on common ports are difficult to detect in the midst of legitimate network traffic [25] . Typically, the packets are small, and few in number. Such scans are difficult to detect, particularly very slow scans. If non-existent hosts and unused ports are probed it is easier to detect because we expect little or no traffic to thase destinations. Visually we will see values plotted for port ranges that have not shown up before as in figure 6.
B.2 Viruses, Worms and Trojans
There are two primary motivations for those who create worms. One is for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and the other for installing Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) servers that receive connections on high ports and relay mail (outbound connection) to port 25 of the desti- Infecting a system usually occurs by exploiting a vulnerability on a system. Once a system is infected, then it will scan for other machines and infect those in a similar way.
A burst of activity will be seen on the vulnerable port. If penetration is successful we typically see odd behavior on a backdoor port which is used to scan for other hosts to infect, see figure 3.
B.3 Backdoors and Rootkits
A backdoor is installed after the successful takeover of a system to help maintain control. It opens a port on the system to send and receive traffic, thereby maintaining a hidden entry point. Unusual activity on a normally active port or non-active port is readily apparent. Packet count and total size increase in a visualization if a significant amount of data is going in and out of the backdoor. Similar to backdoors, rootkits go one step further and replace existing application binaries instead of running as a new application like a backdoor does, e.g. a modified telnet program can be a rootkit. Another covert method to access a port is with IRC bots, which have been used for DDoS attacks. The binary for the bot is small and can easily be installed on someone's system without their knowledge. Commands can then be passed to the bot. Typically the bot is told to attack a given I F address. The servers and channels the bots are placed on can be difficult to find when the channel is set t o hidden. Detecting unknown bot activity requires a check on the default IRC port 6667 or other chose ports (281. In this case, there would be a rise of packets on the IRC port or other chosen ports used to transmit the bot traffic (see figure 7) .
IV. RESULTS
Our prototype helps t o show the pattern and quantity of traffic on parts and systems where unknown attacks can be identified without a signature. Because of the general characteristics of how common attacks behave, this is a useful scheme. Observing port behavior is both a good indicator for a precursor of a n attack or an actual attack. OUT approach did not help to detect malicious behavior during the actuat compromise on the local system (Ie., when someone gained root access). Also, the prototype does not show network topology, layout and link information. Flow information is also not considered, just individual packet header data. Subsequently we get the port information instantaneously, and not wait for a flow to finish, especially that of long flows.
The following graphs are of Sasser worm [SI and botnet 1291 activity from the Honeynet. These results are used to illustrate the efficacy of the system, such as scaling, and overview /det ail.
The first example considers the Sasser worm. Figure 3 shows normal probes and chatter that usually occur. The spikes indicate a n increase of packet count for two port ranges. In region B, the port 400 range in red show the start of Sasser activity which had at that point successfully broken into the system. The tcpdump Iog showed that all of this was from port 445. Region A, which represents ports 1,100-10,000, was a response port to port 445. Again, checking the Log indicated that this was port 2552. This example shows that a user can be guided to notice activity in these port ranges, in the midst of usual traffic. Without having to look at the log, the user can focus on the port 1100 range by filtering the graph to show only the port counts for 400 to 500. This is shown in figure 5 , where we can see that this is port 445. Ports that are commonly used on a network can be sorted the value of port 445 count obscuring the counts. out from the port ranges and plotted on their own. Doing this helps to both focus on the usual active ports for any abnormality and reduce the count from the port ranges. When the count is reduced, we can then focus on the rest of the ports where we do not usually expect traffic without being occluded by the high count of the active ports. We can see the same traffic capture of Sasser in figure 4 where ports from the top ten probed ports list are sorted out from the rest. At that time ports 445, 135, 139, 1026, 53 and
I
In circled region of figure 9, we can see the start of p400 (port 445) , to appear jagged, compared to the original graph count of every 30 minutes. A smaller time sample helps to notice behavior sooner, which is important for a regular network that needs t o react quickly, but at the cost of a smaller picture. One example is the network scan that occurred in 30 minutes (figure 6) where we needed a smaller time scale to quickly notice this activity.
80 were getting probed on the Honeynet, which is why we choose to single these out far this illustration. The circled region shows where port 445 is plotted now. Compared t o figure 3, we can focus on port counts in the ranges minus
We can see the ports with smaller counts more clearly and its pattern over time using a cube root. In the botnet graph, because of the high count of bot packets skewing the scale (around 17,000), all of the other values are barely visible. In figure 8 , we can see the other port activity now. Those were the vulnerabilities the bots were trying to exploit on the Honeynet system, until they were successful and gained access.
V. FUTURE WORK
Our goals are to add a n interactive GUI and with the discussed visual tools implemented to help facilitate more findings into the data. Having a plot with a scaled outside IF address for a multidimensional plot will be helpful for real-time traffic, as we need to know both incoming and outgoing traffic flows. We would like t,o consider ICMP, TCP flag packets and TTL values. These can give useful information and possible patterns as attacks can be composed of these other types of packets. Finding other potential packet and traffic behavior would also be of interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper explained motivations for using information visualization with network data for security purposes. The research performed to come up with our scheme included an explanation of the packet header data and the two modes of real-time and forensic monitoring. We have worked with forensic data and showed these results. Histograms are helpful for determining trends and evaluating quantity.
The parameters for the axis were given as well as scaling issues and solutions. Brief explanations of the general types of attacks that networks encounter were also given to explain how this scheme would be helpful. Current and future work on this prototype was presented followed by the benefits of this prototype and graph results. We presented some techniques that process network data statistics and coupled them with information visualization techniques. These techniques help in detecting anomalies quickly and identifying the cause.
